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I. INTRODUCTION
A. A STORY
N the winter of 1995 I attended a conference of the Association of
American Law Schools ("AALS"), 1 an annual event that offers law
professors an opportunity to attend different meetings and lectures
on the latest legal trends and pedagogical issues involved in the law
school curriculum. My interest was tweaked by the lecture topic for the
antitrust and economic regulation section meeting entitled "Antitrust's
Special Role in the Law School Curriculum." 2 Now that promised to be
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to greatly acknowledge the
continuing generosity of Brooklyn Law School's faculty research stipend program. I would
also like to thank Stetson University College of Law for allowing me to be a scholar in
residence during which time I authored this essay.
1. Association of American Law Schools Conference, New Orleans, La., Jan. 4-8,
1995.
2. The meeting was held on Jan. 6, 1995. Professor Stephen Calkins (Wayne State
University School of Law) served as moderator. Professors Jean Burns (Brigham Young
University School of Law), George Hay (Cornell University School of Law), Thomas Mor-
gan (George Washington University National Law Center), Rudy Peritz (New York Law
School), and John Wiley (U.C.L.A. Law School) were the principle speakers. William
Page (Mississippi College of Law) was the chair and organizer of the meeting.
Professor Page's idea for the program's topic-"Antitrust's Special Role in the Law
School Curriculum"-was meant to stimulate interest in the teaching of antitrust at law
schools. The speakers addressed the relevance of historical approaches to the teaching of
antitrust (Morgan and Pertiz), the role of economic analysis (Hay and Burns), the peda-
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an interesting meeting, I thought. At the very moment public concern
about antitrust enforcement was loosing ground and was on the verge of
becoming marginalized 3 in the emerging postindustrial era,4 antitrust
teachers were meeting to discuss the importance of antitrust in legal edu-
cation.5 I was obviously curious to known what the scholars of antitrust
gogical problems of teaching antitrust injury (Page), and the importance of ethical consid-
erations in antitrust practice (Wiley). I found the meeting discussion to be interesting and
helpful, contrary implications notwithstanding. Sorry, Professor Calkins.
3. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817(1987)(identifying the emergence of a "minimalist" antitrust enforcement policy). As Pro-
fessor Pitofsky has explained:
The only matters that regularly attract the attention of the enforcement au-
thorities are cartels, horizontal mergers tending to create a monopoly, and
various forms of predation. Other practices and transactions that have been
the conventional stuff of antitrust-including all vertical restrictions, price
discrimination, vertical and conglomerate mergers, and non-price connected
boycotts-are either per se legal or challenged only in exceptional circum-
stances. Even in the cartel, horizontal merger, and predation cases, enforce-
ment agencies have introduced various exceptions and qualifications into
prior law and today tend to resolve most doubts in favor of nonintervention.
Id. at 818. See also Robert Pitofsky, Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative:
Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO. L.J. 321 (1987). The minimization of antitrust
enforcement has accelerated in the face of the realities of global competition. In 1990, for
example, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice successfully persuaded Con-
gress that a relaxation of antitrust law was necessary to permit domestic corporations to
enter into joint production agreements in order to compete more effectively in the global
market place. See Alan Murray & Paul M. Barrett, Bush Aides Urge Antitrust Restrictions
Be Eased for U.S. Firms' Joint Ventures, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1990, at A4.
4. "Postindustrial era" refers to the culmination of social, political, and economic
forces now transforming world economies into global markets linked by new informational
technologies. The new markets of the postindustrial era represent what Robert Reich has
identified as "new organizational webs of high-value enterprise, which are replacing the
old core pyramids of high-volume enterprise ... reaching across the globe." ROBERT B.
REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21sT-CENTURY CAPITALISM
110 (1991).
The postindustrial era signifies the emergence of a new type of social life and a new
economic order, which social theorists have called the "postindustrial" or "consumer" soci-
ety of late capitalism. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in THE
ANI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CULTURE 111, 112-13 (Hal Foster, ed. 1983).
Key features of the postindustrial era include the following: the increasing importance of
multinational corporations and institutions in the economy; the development of an infor-
mation economy rather than one based on old notions of "production"; economic power
resulting from the ability to manipulate information rather than the fact of "ownership";
and the decreasing relevance of the nation-state as the source of power and influence. See
id. at 113-14.
5. Antitrust law is a unique course in the law school curriculum. It was one of the
first courses to offer a truly interdisciplinary approach to the study of law, blending as it
does law, history, economics, and politics. I have always thought that antitrust, like labor
law, offers law students an extremely important subject for gaining insight about how our
legal system has attempted to deal with problems of economic power and collective organi-
zation that are not normally discussed in the other subjects taught in the law curriculum.
See Gary Minda, The Common Law, Labor and Antitrust, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 461 (1989).
Because antitrust law is uniquely an American phenomenon (no other country has such a
similar body of law regulating monopolies and restrictive business practices), the study of
antitrust law also offers law students a unique opportunity to gain insight into an important
subject for learning about an important American institution. Antitrust law is an impor-
tant American institution precisely because it is one of the few courses that deals directly
and systematically with value-laden issues about the role of the legal system in curbing, as
well as facilitating, the exercise of private economic power.
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law might have to say about antitrust's significance in an era in which
antitrust law, like its distant cousin, labor law,6 seems to be exhausted, as
a political and legal specialty.7
I arrived at the meeting room of the antitrust section early so that I
could get a seat up front, thinking that attendance at the meeting might
fill the room. The room was large. There were at least a hundred empty
chairs neatly lined up facing a large table for speakers. There were seven
microphones at the podium facing seven professors of law and I expected
that the pending discussions would be a lively event indeed. As the desig-
nated starting time drew near, however, I was surprised that so few law
teachers came. As I sat there, I wondered where were all the antitrust
teachers. Was there a mistake in the program?
The moderator of the meeting, Professor Stephen Calkins of Wayne
State University School of Law, opened the meeting with a brief state-
ment. Yes, there had been a mistake; the meeting room had been
changed at the last moment in anticipation of a large audience, and the
change in the meeting room had not been noted in the program. (I was
unaware of this and accidently walked into the correct meeting room by
chance!) The audience was informed that someone would be posted
outside the listed meeting room to round up antitrust teachers roaming
the halls looking for the antitrust meeting. Apparently, the lost antitrust
teachers were never found since the attendance at the meeting never
greatly appreciated in size.
As I sat there waiting for the meeting to begin, I thought about all
those antitrust teachers "roaming" the halls searching for the antitrust
meeting. The image of the lost antitrust teachers seemed somehow to be
relevant to the meeting's discussion. It then occurred to me that the posi-
tion of antitrust law was very much like the position of the lost antitrust
teachers searching for the antitrust meeting room. Like the law profes-
sors at the law conference, antitrust as a legal and political specialty
seems to be in search of its mission and justification in the emerging new
6. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers' Rights To Self-Organi-
zation Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (detailing how collective bargain-
ing law has declined in contemporary society).
7. One measure of antitrust's steady decline is the dramatic decline in antitrust en-
forcement. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCTG. OFC., REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES (1990) (reporting on the dramatic decline of merger notifica-
tions challenged by the Antitrust Division during the merger-mania years, 1981-1989); Wil-
liam E. Kovacic, Steady Reliever at Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1989, at A14 (reporting
on the dramatic decline of monopolization suits). See also Walter Adams & James W.
Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 COLO. L. REv. 257,
259 (1995).
My experience, as well as that of many antitrust law teachers I know, is that teaching the
basic course in antitrust at the end of the twentieth century-an era characterized by fast-
moving changes brought by globalization, internalization, and technological advance-
ment-is a daunting and frustrating experience. See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sulli-
van, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are
We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Eleanor M. Fox, Teaching and Learning Anti-
trust-Politics, Politics, Casebooks, and Teachers, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1991).
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global world order. The discussion at the AALS antitrust meeting made
this even more clear as the program progressed.
As the title to the program, "Antitrust's Special Role in the Law
School Curriculum" suggested, the meeting offered the distinguished
speakers an opportunity to address a number of interesting issues arising
out of the incredible changes in the world following the end of the Cold
War and the globalization of the American marketplace. A number of
speakers made reference to the pedagogical problems of teaching anti-
trust law from a body of case law that developed largely during the Cold
War period when competition policy was analyzed from a domestic rather
than international perspective.
Many of the classic Supreme Court decisions taught in the basic anti-
trust course, for example, were decided in the 1960s and 1970s when the
Cold War policies of monopoly regulation of large firm size seemed to be
the primary goal of antitrust.8 Most of the leading contemporary deci-
sions-Sylvania,9 Maricopa,l0 NCAA,11 Hyde,12 Aspen,13 Northwest
Wholesale Stationers,14 Matsushita,15 and Sharp16-were decided in the
late 1970s and 1980s, before the break-up of the Soviet Union and the fall
of the Berlin Wall. In the post-Cold War era, antitrust litigation in the
Supreme Court dwindled to only a few relatively unimportant and ques-
tionable decisions. A number of the speakers at the antitrust meeting
lamented that they lacked a meaningful body of post-Cold War era deci-
sions to teach. 17
If that were not enough, speakers also reported on the daunting chal-
lenge of teaching the theoretical economic approaches to antitrust analy-
sis, especially those associated with the "Chicago" and "post-Chicago"
schools of antitrust economics.18 The teaching of antitrust law has indeed
8. Indeed, the Supreme Court's antitrust docket, once fertile ground for antitrust
scholars, has shrunk to only a few cases decided each term, most of which have involved
rather uninteresting and relatively unimportant antitrust issues.
9. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
10. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
11. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
12. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
13. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
14. Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985).
15. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
16. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
17. Perhaps judges are coming to question the presumed logical connection between
large firm size, monopoly power, and harmful business practices. Many seem to believe
that American corporations need monopoly power in order to compete efficiently in global
markets. Competition of foreign trade, a distinctively post-Cold War phenomenon, has
also transformed some of the basic ideas of competition which the law has used analytically
to deal intelligently with antitrust problems.
18. Since the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, there have been a
succession of theoretical "schools" of antitrust analysis, the most recent one shaped by the
antitrust scholarship of Richard A. Posner, Robert Bork, and Frank Easterbrook, which
many regard as the work of the "Chicago School" of antitrust economics. See, e.g., ROB-
ERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); RICHARD POSNER
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posed special challenges given that the theoretical base of antitrust seems
to be disintegrating. 19 The "norm-oriented" perspective of the Chicago
School approach favoring efficiency analysis has faded in the shadow of
the new sophistication of the "fact-oriented" post-Chicago thinking,
which has rejected the wisdom of many of the simplifying assumptions of
the Chicago School approach.20 The new economic sophistication has
& FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERI-
ALS (2d ed. 1981). The Chicago Law School has traditionally established a strong alliance
with the economics department at the University. See NEIL DUXBURY, PA'TERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 348-64 (1995). While it is true that the law and economics
types at Chicago Law School never really adopted the theoretical stance of Chicago School
economists, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, 408, 419-20 (1995), the name
"Chicago School" stuck, forever type-casting the work of law and economics scholars asso-
ciated with the market-oriented analysis of scholars like Henry Simon, Aaron Director,
and Ronald Coase.
The speakers at the meeting talked about the difficulty of introducing economic concepts
and economic theory to second and third year law students who had been trained in the
methods of legal analysis and who were likely to resist the strange new world of economic
analysis. One speaker, an economist, said he never explicitly taught economic theory in his
antitrust classes for fear of losing future class attendance. At least one person from the
audience volunteered, however, that he taught introductory economic analysis in one or
two introductory classes and that his experience was that class size never dropped after so
doing.
19. A new school of economics, known as the "post-Chicago" School, offers new theo-
ries of market behavior and strategic decision making developed from particularized stud-
ies of real markets to challenge the ideological orientation of the Chicago School. See, e.g.,
Symposium on Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445-695 (1995). Moving from
the "norm-oriented" Chicago School approach to the "fact-oriented" post-Chicago ap-
proach, with its focus on particularized analysis of specific industries and market practices,
has meant that antitrust analysis has become more complicated and daunting in the post-
Chicago School era. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Economists,
Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 677, 681 (1995) (arguing that because post-Chicago analysts reject the
generalizations of Chicago's deductive theoretical approach, post-Chicagoans offer policy
makers and law enforcement decision makers a more complex analysis); Michael S. Jacobs,
The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 53 (1994) (arguing that the "athe-
oretical complexity" of the post-Chicago approach to antitrust economics poses many prac-
tical problems of implementation which will encourage decision makers to return to
antitrust's "jurisprudential past."). See also Adams & Brock, supra note 7 (arguing that
the "revisionist" approach of the Chicago School of antitrust economics is incapable of
providing useful insights for judicial antitrust proceedings).
20. See supra note 18. For example, post-Chicago analysts have recently questioned
the assumptions which Chicagoans have relied upon in concluding that the Supreme
Court's theory of leveraging was anti-competitive to the extent that it put into question
leveraging by vertically integrated firms with monopoly power to obtain monopoly posi-
tions in new markets. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 18, at 8-22, 171-84; BORK, supra note
18, at 90-116, 372-82. See also Sullivan, supra note 19, at 671-77. The post-Chicago think-
ing on leveraging rejects the Chicago School's conclusion that leveraging by a vertically
integrated dominant firm is efficient, and instead views leveraging as an open-ended inde-
terminate strategic form of business behavior which may or may not be efficient. See Sev-
erin Borenstein et al., Antitrust Policy in Aftermarkets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 455 (1995);
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515
(1985); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chi-
cago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer
Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (1995). The relevant caselaw on
leveraging is examined in Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical
Strategies by Dominant Firms, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1227 (1992).
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eroded the once uniform assumption of rationality, making it much more
difficult to engage theoretical analyses of economic problems.
A number of the speakers ended their discussion by making fond refer-
ence to what they called the "great antitrust cases" decided by the War-
ren Court during the 1960s and 1970s, especially those cases dealing with
the monopoly power of the dominant firm.2 1 The speakers referred to
this time as an era in which antitrust practice was in its "heyday." During
antitrust law's heyday, ethical issues of litigation and settlement,
problems of proving antitrust injury, and the role of antitrust attorneys in
the protracted antitrust litigation were common problems that were ex-
plicitly discussed by some of the speakers.22 I found the discussion of
these issues, especially those dealing with the ethical dimension of anti-
trust practice, to be interesting and stimulating, but I wondered if I had
mistakenly walked into a meeting on legal history devoted to antitrust's
glorious past.
Indeed, the concluding moments of the antitrust meeting exhibited the
somber mood of a funeral wake-there were speeches about the good
old days when the deceased was alive and kicking, and many stories were
told about the deceased. The speakers spoke with fondness for the good
old days-a time when much energy and money was spent in decentraliz-
ing the American economy. The discussion seemed to break down into a
nostalgiafest devoted to the time when antitrust was a growing legal spe-
cialty responsible for the employment of many young lawyers. What the
speakers neglected to tell the audience was what happened when the
good old days were over.
B. THE CURRENT PREDICAMENT
Antitrust law once reflected a political consensus informed by a gen-
eral popular distrust of private monopoly power. The popular consensus
that launched the antitrust movement and led to the enactment of the
21. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); FTC v. Brown Shoe,
Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959);
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980); United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336
(D.D.C. 1981).
22. During the 1970s, when antitrust litigation was on the upswing, many large and
protracted suits were brought involving ethical and practical problems of case manage-
ment. The litigation involved in Berkey Photo, 444 U.S. at 1093, for example, raised seri-
ous ethical issues involving the destruction of documents relevant to the litigation that
were never produced and false representations by a lawyer seeking to keep this fact secret
from the judiciary (comment by Professor Wiley discussing the "Peck Incident.") See
JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LAW FIRMS ch.
8 (1983). Some of the issues were also particularly troublesome in the IBM cases which
had dominated the attention of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department during
much of the sixties and seventies. See id. ch.2. For a discussion of the legal issues involved
in the IBM cases, see Lawrence A. Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM
Cases, and the Transformation of the Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 587, 599-604 (1982).
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Sherman Antitrust Act2 3 was erected upon a rough political ideal of the
social value of curbing the excesses of private economic power. The
Sherman Act was thus the product of a political and social movement,
rather than a legal or economic convention, that was "characteristically
American."24 The primary goal of the legislation was premised upon a
political judgment that decentralized market power was essential to a free
society.25 This vision of antitrust-the traditional understanding-as-
sumed that antitrust should commit itself to the goal of decentralizing
private economic power.2 6 The political passions that once fueled the an-
titrust movement, however, quickly faded as lawyers and economists
transformed antitrust into a legal specialty.2 7
As a legal specialty, antitrust law peaked during the Warren Court era
and has steadily declined ever since. The decline of antitrust law can be
traced to a number of factors, but certainly one major source has been
the change in antitrust enforcement policies. During the 1980s, policy
makers moved toward what Robert Pitofsky called a "minimalist" policy
of non-enforcement. 28 In the last twenty years, antitrust enforcement has
declined substantially such that "[t]he antitrust laws are enforced more
leniently today than they have been for the last fifty years."12 9 While pri-
vate treble damage litigation continues to be a lucrative enterprise for a
handful of antitrust trial lawyers, private litigation peaked in the 1970s
30
and every indication suggests that this trend of declining private litigation
will only accelerate in the future.31 Public and private antitrust enforce-
ment is thus at an all-time "minimal" level.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). For a history of the period leading to the enactment of the
Act, see HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 227 (1955).
24. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 195 (1965). See also, infra notes
48-68 and accompanying text.
25. Hofstadter, supra note 24, at 205. Of three legislative objectives attributed to the
Sherman Act-economic, political, and social-only the political and social goals seem to
hive enjoyed a general consensus in American society. The economic goal, that regulation
of monopoly power promote economic efficiency, has been "cluttered with uncertainties,
so much so that it seems to be no exaggeration to regard antitrust as being essentially a
political rather than an economic enterprise." Id. at 200.
26. See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The Antitrust Vision and Its Revisionist
Critics, 35 N.Y.L. Sc-. L. REV. 939 (1990).
27. As Richard Hofstadter once put it: "The antitrust movement is one of the faded
passions of American reform." Hofstadter, supra note 24, at 188.
28. See Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, supra note 3, at 821.
29. Id. at 818.
30. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1003 (1986). See also Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100
Years, supra note 3, at 832.
31. Today federal judges are quick to grant summary judgment and motions to dismiss,
making it increasingly difficulty for plaintiffs to reap the benefits of the treble damage
remedy. See Salop & White, supra note 30, at 1011; Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment,
Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust Sys-
tem, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1127-37 (1986). These developments were facilitated by the ap-
pointment of judges to the federal bench during the Reagan and Bush administrations who
were staunch supporters of free market and anti-regulatory views. In appointing a number
of leading Chicago School lawyer-economists to the federal bench, Presidents Reagan and
17551995]
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Antitrust declined in part because changes in the world have made "an-
titrust enforcement politically impracticable. '32 In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, for example, antitrust litigation was brought against
America's most powerful corporations. By the 1980s, however, antitrust
enforcement shifted from regulatory enforcement to de-regulation as so-
cial, economic, and political changes in the American political scene
worked to undermine the self-confidence of the antitrust enforcers of ear-
lier years. During the Warren Court years, antitrust enforcement was
viewed by many policy makers as a necessary solution to the problem of
the "market failure" brought about by monopoly power. Today, policy
makers are more concerned with the problem of "regulatory failure and
government excesses. ''33 Changes in prevailing attitudes about big busi-
ness and government have since eroded the once solid consensus that
supported antitrust as a legal specialty during the sixties and early
seventies.
The legal profession also lost interest in antitrust enforcement as the
antitrust bar came to accept the New Antitrust policy creed of the Chicago
School of antitrust economics.34 The policy creed of the Chicago School
Bush were able to influence the development of antitrust enforcement. See DUXBURY,
supra note 18, at 358. See also William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Anti-
trust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (1991). The appointment of Richard Posner,
Robert Bork (whose subsequent nomination to the Supreme Court failed), and Frank Eas-
terbrook to the federal appeals bench "epitomized" the influence of the Chicago School in
the federal judiciary during the Reagan presidency. DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 358. Also
important has been the Law and Economics Center founded by Henry Manne which offers
a two-week intensive course of study in law and economics for federal judges. Manne's
Chicago-inspired summer seminar for federal judges has so-far introduced antitrust eco-
nomics from the Chicago School perspective to over one-third of the federal judiciary
(judges attend with all expenses paid by corporate sponsors). Id. at 360. As Professor
Duxbury recently concluded:
[T]he Manne initiative has clearly proved successful in exposing a significant
proportion of the federal judiciary to a particular style of legal-economic in-
quiry; and there indeed appears to be at least some evidence that certain
judges, after having attended the programme, have begun to apply the princi-
ples of Chicago neo-classical analysis in the resolution of antitrust cases.
Id. at 360-61 (footnote omitted). The fact that corporations fund "Manne's initiative" to
essentially persuade federal judges on the wisdom of a minimal antitrust enforcement pol-
icy is rather curious and troublesome.
32. Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, supra note 3, at 821.
33. ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTI-
TRUST 3 (1989) (stating that "[T]oday . . .American productivity has been falling and
American hegemony fading. We talk less of market failure, more of regulatory failure and
governmental excesses.").
34. In the Cold War era, antitrust law had become almost the exclusive concern of a
handful of legal specialists who were concerned with protecting a domestic economy from
the dangers of monopoly power. By the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, a new group
of antitrust thinkers came to adopt a pro-monopoly bias as they turned away from the non-
economic justifications and embraced the single policy goal of allocative efficiency and
maximization of wealth. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 18; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, Corre-
spondence: Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MicH-. L. REV. 1696 (1986). The efficiency-ori-
ented approach of this new type of antitrust thinking, however, failed to remove from
antitrust adjudication the necessity of making value choices. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The
Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 558 (1986) ("The tools of economics may be neutral, but we who must
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attempts to explain and justify business practices of large firms on the
basis of economic models developed from assumptions of rational behav-
ior. Rational behavior is defined in terms of self-interested profit-maxi-
mizing conduct. If the business practice serves the purpose of maximizing
firm profits, it is presumed to be rational and, therefore, beneficial to
competition.35 Antitrust enforcement has thus been limited to forms of
irrational business behavior that cannot be explained on rational (i.e.,
profit-maximizing) grounds.36
The success of Chicago School thinking in antitrust has helped to bring
about a body of antitrust doctrine which evaluates the legality of business
practices in terms of whether they promote or hinder economic efficiency
in production (a factor essential to profit-maximizing behavior). An early
example of this was the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Sylvania which
rejected the Warren Court's per se vertical restraint test and adopted the
Chicago School's "free rider" analysis of vertical territorial restraints.37
While the Court has not yet overruled many of the leading Warren Court
precedents, there is ample evidence indicating that a majority of the
Supreme Court justices accept now the Chicago School analysis and pol-
icy creed in antitrust decision making.38 The resulting shift in the
Supreme Court's thinking in antitrust has contributed to the decline in
antitrust enforcement. Suffice it to say that antitrust law is no longer a
growth industry.
One would think that much ink would be spilled in the popular press
about antitrust's current predicament. Antitrust, after all, has been a pe-
culiar American institution which historically has been as American as
"apple pie" and the "fourth of July." Indeed, the fear of concentrated
private power which has historically justified enforcement of the antitrust
laws has a long and meaningful history in American culture. Antitrust
legislation was inspired by the same social and political concerns and
select and use them are not."). For a critical review of the Chicago School approach in the
Supreme Court, see William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989).
35. Robert Bork thus argued that terms like "competition" and "monopoly" should be
read by antitrust judges as shorthand expressions, or terms of art, designating states of
affairs that refer to the economist's concepts of productive efficiency and consumer wel-
fare. BORK, supra note 18, at 61. In linking competition and monopoly to economic con-
cepts of productive efficiency and consumer welfare, Bork was able to argue that the only
real goal of antitrust enforcement was the promotion of economic efficiency. See id.
36. See Page, supra note 34, at 1232-33.
37. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In rejecting the
Warren Court's per se test in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
the Court reasoned that vertical territorial restrictions would be justified when they were
found to prevent competitors from taking a "free ride" on the distributional services of a
dealer. The Court's "free rider" analysis was explicitly borrowed from Chicago School
antitrust scholars.
38. The Court has not, however, accepted the full implications of the Chicago School's
theoretical models of antitrust (e.g., the Court has refused to adopt the suggestion of Chi-
cago analysts who argued in support of antitrust rules of per se legality in vertical restraint
cases). See William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EM-
ORY L.J. 1, 49 (1995). The Court has also declined to overrule the Warren Court's leading
antitrust precedents since Sylvania. Id. at 48.
19951 1757
SMU LAW REVIEW
precepts that motivated our founding fathers to adopt a constitutional
policy of limited government and deconcentrated government powers.39
Like the American constitutional system, the Sherman Act can be read as
a text that "prescribes a central governance system for the economy
which is also based on the principle of decentralized decision making. '40
Is it not strange then that there has been so little public interest in the
decline of antitrust?41 Why has the media not reported on more of anti-
trust's new policy supporting the existence of centralized economic deci-
sion making? Why has there been so little concern for the steady decline
of what has been an important and peculiarly American hundred-year
institution? It would indeed appear that politicians, historians, social crit-
ics, and media types have ignored "one of the most delicious minor iro-
nies of our reform history and one of the most revealing facets of our
institutional life." 42
Any effort to explain the current predicament of antitrust would re-
quire some explanation of the decline of antitrust as a legal and political
movement. Antitrust can be retold in terms of a story about what hap-
pens when a reform movement becomes institutionalized, first by the
"law," and then later by a social science- "economics." We can retell the
story of antitrust in terms of a progression of events that moved from
politics, to law, to economics. Each stage in this progression has led to a
transformation in antitrust enforcement. Each stage in this progression
has also distanced antitrust law from its political origins as a reform
movement in American politics. 43 Antitrust began passionately as a re-
form movement, but then fizzled and cooled as the movement was institu-
tionalized and rationalized first by lawyers, and then later by lawyer-
economists. Today, antitrust has lost touch with its origins and history
and, therefore, it has become (like the lost antitrust teachers at the AALS
conference) a law "in search of itself.""
39. See Adams & Brock, supra note 26, at 940.
40. Id.
41. Surely, if some future Solicitor General publicly declared that the S.G. office was
intending to do to the United States Constitution what the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department during the Reagan and Bush administrations did to the Sherman Act (i.e.,
interpret the document to authorize centralized government power at the expense of the
states), there would be much public debate and criticism in the popular media. Consider,
for a moment, the dramatic public statement of William F. Baxter, President Reagan's first
Chief of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, made soon after Baxter took over at
the Antitrust Division: "There is nothing written in the sky that says that the world would
not be a perfectly satisfactory place if there were only 100 companies . . . " Big Shift in
Antitrust Policy, Dun's Rev., Aug. 1981, at 38, 38. The statement was hardly even noticed
by the media.
42. Hofstadter, supra note 24, at 189-90.
43. For an earlier account of this, see id. at 188. See also infra notes 48-68 and accom-
panying text.
44. Other antitrust thinkers have borrowed this phrase in describing the current pre-
dicament in antitrust law. See Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A
Century Past and the Future, 75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 959 (1987) ("My theme is the narrower
one of, to borrow a phrase, the law in search of itself.").
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In what follows I will attempt to begin where my story left off (i.e., I
will attempt to explore the reasons for antitrust's current predicament).
First, I will re-examine some of the reasons for the decline of antitrust as
a political and legal movement. 45 Second, I will examine some of the
current competitive problems that are just now arising in the emerging
postindustrial markets in the informational economies of the information
superhighway. 46 Finally, I will conclude by speculating on the likely
changes that must take place if antitrust, as a legal specialty, is to remain
more than just a "faded passion" in the twenty-first century.4 7 The loss of
belief in antitrust's historical role in regulating monopoly power must be
recovered if antitrust is to remain politically relevant in the next century.
II. WHATEVER DID HAPPEN TO THE
ANTITRUST MOVEMENT?
My attendance at the section meeting on antitrust law succeeded in
making Richard Hofstadter's classic essay "What Happened to the Anti-
trust Movement? ' 48 especially relevant to me. In that essay (first pub-
lished in 1964), Hofstadter argued that antitrust had lost its historical role
and meaning as a movement because it was no longer the subject of pub-
lic agitation-in short, it had become (at or around 1938) a "complex,
difficult, and boring" legal specialty.49 The late Hofstadter went on to
argue that historians had lost interest in antitrust because what was once
a subject of public concern had become a baffling maze of technical re-
finements created by lawyers and economists that historians and enlight-
ened citizens were ill-equipped to comprehend. Hofstadter saw a
paradox in this: "once the United States had an antitrust movement with-
out antitrust prosecutions; in our time there have been antitrust prosecu-
tions without an antitrust movement. '50
A. HOFSTADTER'S THESIS
In viewing the Sherman Act as the "manifestation of an enduring
American suspicion of concentrated power,"'-5 Hofstadter wondered if
antitrust could survive in "an age in which the big corporation has be-
come a way of life."'52 Hofstadter identified three distinct phases in the
45. See infra Part II.
46. See infra Part III.
47. See infra Part IV. My effort here is not to run down antitrust law and policy. To
the contrary, I count myself as someone who believes that the "old problem" of market
power remains a danger justifying governmental regulation. On the other hand, because I
believe that the problem of market power has evolved into new forms in the emerging
postindustrial markets, I will argue that policy makers need new tools and new methods for
rendering the antitrust laws applicable to new competitive dangers.
48. Hofstadter, supra note 24, at 188. Hofstadter was a distinguished professor of
American history at Columbia University.
49. Id. at 189.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 205.
52. Hofstadter, supra note 24, at 224.
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history of antitrust. First, in the "Progressive era" from about 1890-1914,
Hofstadter saw the antitrust movement in "high gear" where politicians
and judges attempted to define an antitrust response to the consolidation
of business enterprises and the popular hostility to big business. 5 3 During
the Progressive era, the Sherman Act was signed into law and federal
judges tentatively began the difficult process of applying the law to big
business. Hofstadter found that "[t]he Progressive era, which culminated
in 1914 with the passing of the Clayton Act and the creation of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, probably marks the high point of anti-big-busi-
ness sentiment in our history."'54
In the second phase, what Hofstadter called the "era of neglect," that
lasted from approximately 1914 to about 1937, antitrust enforcement was,
as it is today, "minimal. '55 During this time, the antitrust movement was
seriously questioned by those who "saw the Western world as entering
upon a new era of organization and specialization for which the old com-
petitive philosophy [of the Sherman Act] was hopelessly retrograde. '56
These early critics of antitrust "foresaw the decline of antitrust as a move-
ment, and in some instances recognized that if the Sherman Act persisted
it would be as a basis for occasional ad hoc regulatory suits rather than as
an instrument for dismantling the corporate economy."'57
In the third phase, the era of antitrust's "revival," that dated from 1937
to the mid-1960s, antitrust enforcement by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission accelerated
and the law congealed as a serious legal specialty.5 8 Hofstadter found the
revival period to be quite "ironic" in that legal and administrative activity
flowered at the same time that public sentiment against big business dissi-
pated. 59 Hofstadter concluded that antitrust as a political movement
steadily declined during this time as more Americans became more re-
spectful to the existence of large corporations.
During the era of antitrust revival, when enforcement accelerated, Hof-
stadter saw antitrust becoming "almost exclusively the concern of small
groups of legal and economic specialists, who carry on their work without
widespread public interest or support. '60 Hofstadter thus concluded that
the traditional American fear of big business that fueled the passions of
the antitrust movement in the period of 1890-1937, dissipated in the years
following the New Deal, and thereafter, up until the present, antitrust has
been a legal and bureaucratic specialty and not a "movement" as such.
Hofstadter sought to explain why "the fate of antitrust is an excellent
illustration of how a public ideal, vaguely formulated and often hope-
53. Id. at 193.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 193.
56. Id. at 204.
57. Id.
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lessly at odds with stubborn realities, can become embodied in institu-
tions with elaborate, self-preserving rules and procedures, a defensible
function, and an equally stubborn capacity for survival. '61
The rise in living standards in the American economy in the post-World
War II era was hardly the basis for sustaining the traditional American
fear of big business.62 Hofstadter went on to explain how the transforma-
tion of antitrust from a political movement to a legal specialty had none-
theless enabled the "antitrust enterprise" to persist and grow despite the
fact that antitrust was often "hopelessly at odds with stubborn realities"
of a "business structure [that] has brought into being a managerial class
of immense social and political as well as market power. '"63 As Hof-
stadter saw it, by the mid-1960s, the problem of bigness was no longer a
"problem" for most Americans. 64 And yet, paradoxically throughout the
1960s the Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl War-
ren developed antitrust doctrines under an "intentionalist vision" 65 that
helped to solidify an antitrust policy favoring deconcentrated markets.
Hofstadter was interested in knowing why historians had lost interest
in antitrust; he wanted to know why there were no serious histories of
antitrust and why there was so little academic interest in the subject. He
concluded that historians dropped antitrust from their academic agendas
shortly after the New Deal reactivated the Antitrust Division and private
antitrust lawyers and economists became serious about enforcing the
Sherman Act. According to Hofstadter, some time after 1934 or therea-
bouts, "[a]ntitrust [became] almost exclusively the concern of small
groups of legal and economic specialists, who carry on their work without
widespread public interest or support."'66 What was once a movement of
public concern and agitation had become a legal-administrative specialty
carried on by bureaucratic experts in an institutional bureaucracy called
antitrust.
61. Id. at 228.
62. As Hofstadter observed: "Today the public needs no persuading that it is the large
corporations, with their programs of research, that are technologically progressive." Id. at
217. This is even more true in today's global markets dominated by multinational corpora-
tions. It is also interesting to note that antitrust has continued to decline even during the
protracted economic recession following the market crash of 1987. Economic prosperity
cannot therefore be the sole cause of antitrust law's decline.
63. Hofstadter, supra note 24, at 236.
64. Hofstadter relied on a 1951 research study of the University of Michigan, entitled
Big Business as the People See It, that showed "big business was no longer a scare word to
the public at large." Id. at 212, 213.
65. See Page, supra note 38, at 6,29-42. Professor Page calls the Warren Court's vision
of antitrust "intentionalism" because the Court instrumentally attempted to shape antitrust
law to protect the competitive freedom of individual actors in the marketplace. "In the
intentionalist view of things, injury to the individual firm was in itself an injury to competi-
tion when it limited the individual's ability to make critical decisions." Id. at 28-29. Profes-
sor Page thus rejects the revisionary account of Chicago School theorists like Robert Bork
who argue that the Warren Court's vision of antitrust protected small business as such. Id.
at 28. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 18, at 200-2, 204-5, 256-57.
66. Hofstadter, supra note 24, at 194.
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Without doubt, by the mid-1960s, the legal specialty that had come to
represent antitrust was enormously successful in establishing antitrust as
an institution "with elaborate, self-preserving rules and procedures, a de-
fensible function, and an equally stubborn capacity for survival. '67 The
decline of the antitrust movement was thus seen by Hofstadter as the
logical consequence of antitrust becoming a legal specialty. As Hof-
stadter explained:
In ceasing to be largely an ideology and becoming largely a tech-
nique, antitrust has taken its place among a great many other ele-
ments of our society that have become differentiated, specialized,
and bureaucratized. Since no layman can any longer concern himself
with the enormous body of relevant case law or with the truly formi-
dable literature of economic analysis and argument that has come to
surround the issue, the potentialities of antitrust action have become
almost exclusively the concern of a technical elite of lawyers and
economists. Indeed, the business of studying, attacking, defending,
and evaluating oligopolistic behavior and its regulation has become
one of our lively small industries, which gives employment to many
gifted professional men. No doubt this is another, if lesser, reason
why antitrust has become self-sustaining: it is not our way to liqui-
date an industry in which so many have a stake.68
Hofstadter concluded that America's old romance with antitrust had run
its course by the mid-1960s as antitrust became entrenched as a bureau-
cratic specialty administered by lawyers and economists.
B. LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE AND ANTITRUST
Antitrust was a vibrant legal specialty with a glowing future during the
mid-1960s, the period when Hofstadter wrote his essay. As a legal spe-
cialty, antitrust was an important legal specialty as Hofstadter explained,
but it was hardly evident, even during Hofstadter's time, that the antitrust
movement had run its course. It may have been true that the attitudes
and values of the old antitrust reform movement no longer captured the
attention of the American public by the mid-1960s, but this did not mean
that antitrust law failed to sustain a political vision or ideology. To the
contrary, antitrust lawyers, economists, and judges throughout the 1960s
and 1970s developed a powerful new ideology providing support for anti-
trust as a legal institution.
The legal ideology of antitrust law (as distinguished from the ideology
of antitrust's early reform movement) developed from the law's legal pro-
cess jurisprudence. Legal process jurisprudence was dominant during the
Warren Court era and it continues to influence the Court's current anti-
67. Id. at 228. According to Hofstadter, "[i]nstitutions are commonly less fragile than
creeds." ld
68. Id. at 235-36.
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trust philosophy.69 To be sure, legal process jurisprudence has been on a
steady decline as new scholarly movements like law and economics, criti-
cal legal studies, and postmodernism came on the scene and moved be-
yond process theory. 70 Process theory nonetheless remains dominant in
the legal academy, and many lawyers and judges, indoctrinated by tradi-
tional modes of legal pedagogy, continue to adhere to the views of pro-
cess theory in their various legal practices. Antitrust law, like many other
legal subjects, was, and continues to be, shaped by the popular influences
of the legal process tradition.
Hofstadter, writing in 1964, believed that once antitrust was taken over
by lawyers and economists, antitrust was purely a technical, bureaucratic
specialty.71 As it turns out, however, it was that and much more. As a
legal specialty, antitrust became fused with the lawyer's professional ide-
ology. It was the lawyer's faith in the law's process that, more than any-
thing else, encouraged antitrust lawyers and judges during the Warren
Court era to focus on the process of competition as a basis for implement-
ing the goals of the antitrust laws.
Beginning in the early 1960s, for example, the Warren Court developed
the notion that the antitrust laws required the courts to protect the com-
petitive process against the tendency toward market concentration. A
majority of the justices believed that it was the responsibility of the fed-
eral judiciary to ensure that "local control" over industries be preserved
and that the law protect the small business person from the overreaching
of those who had access to overpowering wealth.72 "[I]njury to the indi-
69. See Page, supra note 38, at 49-70. For a review and summary of the legal process
tradition in American jurisprudence, see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVE-
MENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 33-36 (1995).
70. See MINDA, supra note 69, at 83-127, 224-46.
71. Hofstadter, supra note 24, at 235. Hofstadter's essay also failed to acknowledge
the non-technical contribution that antitrust juries have performed in private treble ac-
tions. Juries composed of lay persons selected from the community are likely to bring to
antitrust decision making the traditional attitudes and fears about big business that had
nurtured the early passions of antitrust when antitrust was a political movement. Jury tri-
als have also softened the highly technical nature of antitrust legal theories by forcing law-
yers and economists to translate technical legal theories into a language which is
understandable by lay persons. The practical abilities of juries have justified the denial of
jury trials in highly complex antitrust cases. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538
n.10 (1970); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1089 (3d Cir. 1980);
Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75
CAL. L. REv. 797, 813 (1987). Antitrust juries continue to play an important social and
political function in private antitrust suits. Thus, antitrust jury trials have served an impor-
tant function in preserving the "populist goals" of the antitrust movement. But see id
(arguing that there would be "no overriding disadvantages to eliminating jury trials of pri-
vate antitrust suits").
72. Chief Justice Earl Warren thus began his famous opinion in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (involving the legality of a merger under § 7 of the
Clayton Act of 1950) by declaring that: "The dominant theme pervading congressional
consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide
of economic concentration in the American economy... [and] the desirability of retaining
'local control' over industry and the protection of small business." Id. at 315. Robert Bork
correctly associates this statement with one of the central creeds of the Warren Court's
antitrust philosophy. BORK, supra note 18, at 201-202. Bork assumes that such statements
illustrated that the Court was primarily concerned with protecting small business. Other
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vidual firm was in itself an injury to competition when it limited the indi-
vidual's ability to make critical decisions. This was what the Warren
Court meant by injury to competitive processes .... Private discretion
and competitive markets were [assumed to be] inseparable. 73
The Warren Court's focus on protecting competitive process was very
much in keeping with legal process jurisprudence, which encouraged law-
yers and judges to place emphasis on process issues rather than on the
substance of antitrust adjudication generally. 74 The most basic insight of
process theory was the idea that the efficient administration of legal dis-
putes required an analysis of how different institutions of government re-
solve disputes. The relative effectiveness of institutions in solving social
problems was viewed by process theorists as peculiarly a matter of pro-
cess and procedure. The institutional competency of different institutions
(e.g., courts, legislature, and markets) thus required a comparative analy-
sis of the different procedures and processes utilized by each institution to
resolve social problems. 75 Efficient dispute resolution was thus aimed at
discovering the most effective process for resolving disputes.
Process theorists assumed that private ordering of social problems was
generally the preferred process for resolving most social problems. 76
Public regulation of private activity was thought to be warranted only
when the "processes of private ordering [was] found to be wanting." 77
The role of the judiciary was, therefore, one of preserving the effective
processes of private markets and majoritarian politics. In this way, legal
process jurisprudence supported and justified a form of "utilitarian lais-
commentators, however, argue that the Warren Court was more interested in protecting
"injury to the individual firm" and that this was more in keeping with the Court's interest
in protecting the process of competition rather than simply favoring small businesses. See
Page, supra note 38, at 28-29.
73. Page, supra note 38, at 29.
74. Professor Page has recently explained how process thinking has influenced the way
the Supreme Court has incorporated the Chicago School approach to antitrust in its anti-
trust decisions.
Rather than overrule established precedents, the Court has reinterpreted
those precedents in light of Chicago's positive models, integrating the in-
sights of the models with the Warren Court's formal standards. They have
altered the doctrine primarily by formulating subsidiary decisional rules that
govern the application of the rules of liability, that define the types of harm
that are compensable in private suits, and that determine the sufficiency of
evidence to go to the jury.
Id. at 51.
75. To this end, legal process theorists developed an analysis of "institutional settle-
ment"-hence, "[tlhe central idea of law [was] the principle of institutional settlement."
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (10th ed. 1958) (emphasis in original). Hart and
Sacks legal process material represents the foundational text of legal process
jurisprudence.
76. This assumption emerges from Hart and Sacks's comparative analysis of courts
and the legislature. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 257.
77. Id. at 257 (discussing the nature of legal process jurisprudence associated with the
work of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks).
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sez-faire liberalism," which legal thinkers have assumed to be the consen-
sus ideology of the American polity. 78
From the perspective of legal process, judges in antitrust disputes
viewed the private competitive process as the desirable means for achiev-
ing the goals of antitrust legislation. The open-ended nature of the anti-
trust laws have enabled antitrust decision makers to develop the insights
of economic analysis within a framework of antitrust process. Protecting
competition has thus meant that judges might have to come to the aid of
an individual competitor whenever the competitive process was found to
be "injured" by the monopolistic and predatory conduct of dominant
firms. 79 It has been assumed that the competitive process provided the
courts with an objective and neutral medium for establishing an efficient
system of private market ordering. Ideas about competitive process have
thus been used by antitrust judges to develop a body of administrative
rules to guide the development of antitrust doctrine.
For example, the focus of the Warren Court in antitrust during much of
the 1960s and 1970s was not one of protecting small competitors as such,
but rather one of protecting the process which enabled individual actors
to act freely in the market.80 The Court's focus on protecting against
interferences with the "process" of competition was thought necessary for
the preservation of the presumed link between competitive process and
democracy. 8' Process theorists assumed, for example, that the competi-
tive process of interest group representation in the legislative branch of
government would serve to realize the maximization of the public inter-
est. For process theorists, the process of competition was a crucial vehicle
for maintaining the functions of a pluralistic, democratic society. Hence,
it was thought that it was the judiciary's function to ensure that the pro-
cess of competitive forces would "harness the individual appetite for pri-
vate gain to social ends."'82
While the Warren Court antitrust decisions were consistent with the
political and social values of the antitrust movement (values like diver-
78. Id.
79. See Page, supra note 38, at 29; John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept of a
Competitive Process, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 893 (1990).
80. It is often said that the Warren Court was concerned with the problem of big busi-
ness since its antitrust decisions seemed overly protective of small business, but, as Profes-
sor William Page has recently pointed out, "the Warren Court did not frame rules simply to
favor small business." Page, supra note 38, at 28. The history of antitrust enforcement
during the Warren Court era reveals that the Court was concerned with protecting "the
individual's ability to make critical decisions" in the market. Id. at 29. The Warren Court
assumed that "injury to the individual firm was in itself an injury to competition when it
limited the individual's ability to make critical decisions." Id at 28-29.
81. The Warren Court was undoubtedly influenced by the theory of political pluralism.
The theory of political pluralism, advanced in the work of 1950s theorists such as Robert
Dahl, assumed that interest group representation provided an integral process for the ef-
fective administration of representative democracy. The theory of political pluralism can
be seen to justify the Warren Court's Noerr-Pennington doctrine in antitrust law. See Gary
Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 905 (1990).
82. Adams & Brock, supra note 26, at 941.
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sity, individual autonomy, deconcentrated power, etc.), the Court's legal
process jurisprudence attempted to justify antitrust doctrine and caselaw
on the basis of an objective and consistent body of principles, purposes,
and, of course, process.83 The rationalistic premises of process jurispru-
dence thus pulled antitrust law away from its political and social origins
and placed the law of antitrust on a legal trajectory that has since exhib-
ited an "other-world" quality. Competitive policy was to be structured by
a natural and enduring competitive process regulated by objective legal
criteria.84 The problem was the competitive process could not be realisti-
cally defended on the basis of such criteria because competition was
neither fixed nor natural, but was rather an essentially contested
concept.85
Legal process jurisprudence nonetheless encouraged antitrust judges to
try to develop a legal theory of antitrust-one that was quite different
from the vision reflected in antitrust's political and social origins. Es-
chewing substance and favoring process meant that process theorists were
strong advocates of principled reason in legal decision making. It meant
that political values would be given effect only if they complied with the
legal process values-that is conformed to "reasoned elaboration" and
satisfied the test of neutral principles (i.e., be applied consistently and
rationally in all similar antitrust decisions). Antitrust as a legal specialty
83. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Warren Court was busy developing legal ra-
tionales for the view that the Sherman Antitrust Act mandated the development of a body
of antitrust rules and procedures to govern the process of competition of private enter-
prise. Suffice it to say that the Warren Court's efforts to develop a consistent body of
antitrust doctrine failed. The Warren Court's efforts in antitrust led to the development of
a policy that came to be recognized as a "policy at war with itself." See BORK, supra note
18.
84. Ideas developed from the political theory of democratic pluralism undoubtedly
influenced the Court's legal process thinking.
In public law areas, process theorists relied on the political theory of plural-
ism in their analysis of the functions of democratically elected legislatures
and they used this analysis to expose the antidemocratic nature of the judici-
ary .... In private law areas, process theorists urged the 'reasoned elabora-
tion' of the principles and policies of the common law. This meant that
judges, unlike legislators, had limited discretion; they were supposed to de-
cide like cases alike under the guiding force of case precedent and statutory
law. Judges were supposed to 'elaborate' rational 'reasons' for their
decisions.
MINDA, supra note 69, at 34-35.
85. The effort to develop consistent administrative rules to govern the process of com-
petition was doomed from the start. To put it simply, competition is an essentially con-
tested concept, defined by opposing ideas about competition. One way to understand this
is to consider the relationship that competition shares with its antitheses-contract and
combination. Ideas of contract, combination, and competition share a dangerous supple-
mentary relation-contract and combination are necessary for competition to work in
some cases, yet the existence of contract and combination are also dangerous to the pro-
cess of competition in other cases (they may lead to monopoly, the antithesis of competi-
tion). Hence, protecting the freedom of individual competitors may sometimes undermine
competition by allowing inefficient actors to exist free of the disciplinary forces of the
market; and protecting competitive process may sometimes mean that individual choice
must be limited. See Minda, supra note 5, 462-63.
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came to reflect the lawyer's faith in process jurisprudence. 86 Antitrust
law thus developed on the basis of legal concepts of reason based on
ideas about the political and legal process. 87
As a consequence of legal process thinking, antitrust judges focused
their energies on developing administrative principles, purposes, and
processes for determining how the substantive merits of antitrust disputes
should be resolved. Hence, we see throughout the 1960s and 1970s judi-
cial emphasis on the development of decisional rules like per se and the
rule of reason, the doctrines of standing and antitrust injury for determin-
ing the types of antitrust harm that are compensable, and evidentiary
standards for determining the sufficiency of the evidence that would jus-
tify decisions on the merits.8a Even today, commentators see the
Supreme Court's antitrust decisions attempting to integrate new learning
about antitrust within an incremental "process" of case-by-case decision
making.89
By the end of the 1970s, antitrust's specialists-lawyers and econo-
mists-were building new foundations for a new antitrust movement.
What Hofstadter failed to foresee was the possibility that a new type of
movement might emerge within the legal institution of antitrust. 90 In-
86. It has been said that legal process jurisprudence "exemplifies the emergence of
reason as the dominant ideological and theoretical motif in American legal thought ....
The history of process jurisprudence is a history of American lawyers attempting to un-
cover reason immanent in law." DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 205, 298. As Duxbury
explained:
Process jurisprudence.., marks the beginning of American lawyers attempt-
ing to explain legal decision-making not in terms of deductive logic or the
intuitions of officials, but in terms of reason which is embodied in the fabric
of law itself. By finding faith in reason, it has been remarked, process juris-
prudence illustrates how post-war American legal theorists turned their at-
tention to 'the task of finding an objective basis for legal decision-making.'
Id. at 205 (quoting James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local
Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 703 (1985)). In other words,
[p]rocess theorists defend[] the view that right answers in legal decision
making could be developed from a conceptual understanding of the institu-
tional functions and competency of different governmental agencies of the
legal system .... Because they asserted the autonomy of the legal process,
process theorists rejected the claims of those ... who advocated the develop-
ment of non-legal criteria for judicial decision making.
MINDA, supra note 69, at 34. In antitrust law, legal process jurisprudence thus helped to
de-radicalize antitrust by minimizing the importance of the social and political values in
antitrust decision making.
87. MINDA, supra note 69, at 34-35.
88. See Page, supra note 38, at 51.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Hofstadter's idea of an "antitrust movement" was wedded to traditional thinking
about the reform movements of politics, such as the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
Disenchanted with the politics of the mainstream, reform movements such as the civil
rights movement, attempted to reform law and society through direct forms of non-violent
political unrest. See BARBARA EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PROTEST AND CULTURAL REVOLU-
TION: NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION IN THE 1970S AND 1980s (1991).
If we think of the antitrust movement as a reform movement like civil rights, it should
not be all that surprising that the "antitrust movement" lasted for a relatively temporary
period following the enactment of the Sherman Act. Like all political reform movements,
the direct popular action inspired by the antitrust reform movement was certain to dissi-
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deed, by the late 1970s, one can detect the formation of a new antitrust
movement constructed from a new theoretical perspective of the legal
process developed from economics. 91 This new antitrust movement de-
veloped first in the law schools, and then later it became part of the offi-
cial policy of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department during the
Reagan and Bush administrations. The New Antitrust movement ad-
vanced the case for a minimalist antitrust enforcement policy, and it has
since nurtured the deregulatory impulses favoring big business. This new
vision of antitrust was established by Robert Bork, Richard Posner, Frank
Easterbrook, and other Chicago School Law and Economics theorists
who proclaimed to have launched a New Antitrust movement.92
C. THE NEW ANTITRUST MOVEMENT
The Chicago School of antitrust economics has since become enor-
mously successful in shifting antitrust policy to an efficiency analysis that
rejects, in many cases, the traditional policy bias against big business. In
emphasizing the past failures of antitrust as a legal specialty, Chicago
School antitrust scholars argued with considerable passion and persua-
sion that the only legitimate goal for antitrust law is efficiency and the
maximization of wealth. The Chicago School antitrust advocates argued
that business restraints of trade should be immunized from antitrust pros-
ecutions whenever it can be shown that the challenged practice promotes
economic efficiency. While the Chicago School advocated an explicit
economic agenda, its agenda was just as "political" as the agenda of the
pate in the years following the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act. As the courts
became serious about antitrust enforcement in the Progressive era, there was little for anti-
trust activists to protest, and thus the energy for getting the public involved in antitrust
reform dissipated.
What Hofstadter failed to foresee is the emergence of a new type of antitrust movement
in legal academia. During the 1970s and 1980s, for example, new scholarly movements
came into existence claiming to represent legal and nonlegal academics and practitioners
who adhere to diverse understandings about modern law and adjudication. See MINDA,
supra note 69. Indeed, one of the most salient characteristics of reform movements in the
post-war era, has been the formation of a new type of social movement within academic
and theoretical communities. The movements of the sixties (e.g., feminism, the New Left,
and Marxism) developed from a critical analysis of traditional theories and conventional
practices. See EPSTEIN, supra note 90, at 227-61. These movements have been limited to
academic and scholarly communities, but they aspire, like all reform movements, to influ-
ence the views of a larger audience-judges, lawyers, and citizens in general. In antitrust
law, one could detect the development, in the early 1970s and thereafter, of a scholarly
antitrust movement known as the Chicago School of antitrust or the "New Learning." See,
e.g., Adams & Brock, supra note 26, at 941-46.
91. Like other reform movements, the Chicago School of antitrust analysis could claim
a membership of individuals who shared a common vision aimed at reforming antitrust
law. Like all reform movements, the Chicago School advanced a political perspective and
method that departed radically from the mainstream view of antitrust law. The political
vision of the Chicago School antitrust analyst was as political and visionary as that of the
early trustbuster during antitrust's progressive era. The new antitrust movement was
aimed at reinvigorating antitrust with a political mission, albeit a mission that was quite
different from the one imagined by the likes of Senator Sherman or the other drafters of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.
92. See supra note 18.
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earlier antitrust reform movement, or, for that matter, the antitrust
agenda of the Warren Court. Hence, "[w]hile the image of Chicago eco-
nomic analysis embodying an 'anti-antitrust' perspective is somewhat ex-
aggerated-most lawyer-economists in the Chicago tradition wish to see
the legal regulation of monopoly limited and exercised realistically rather
than abolished-it is by no means insignificant. ' 93
There is ample reason for associating the New Antitrust movement
with an "anti-antitrust" perspective. 94 Indeed, the antitrust vision of the
Chicago School of antitrust came to support the political agenda of Ron-
ald Reagan's administration throughout the 1980s. The antitrust vision of
the Chicago School was manifested when President Reagan appointed
William Baxter, a Chicago School antitrust legal academician from Stan-
ford University, to the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. 95
The dominant policy perspective of Reagan's Antitrust Chief was much
in keeping with the basic normative dimension of Chicago antitrust analy-
sis-the judiciary should cease protecting competitors as such, and in-
stead focus their effort in protecting the ability of American corporations
to promote allocative efficiency.96
The New Antitrust movement attempts to perfect and render pure the
aspirations of the legal process tradition by marrying antitrust to econom-
ics rather than law. Antitrust principles, purposes, and processes would
be rendered coherent and objective by interpreting the Sherman Anti-
trust Act in light of the Chicago School's normative vision of economics;
the law would be applied so that it would promote economic efficiency
and wealth maximization in the economy. 97 The legal regulation of mo-
nopoly would be limited and antitrust enforcement policy, shaped by this
creed, would adopt its current "minimalist" stance. The legal specialty
that Hofstadter had identified in the mid-1960s had thus become prisoner
to the New Antitrust movement which many now see as embodying an
"anti-antitrust perspective." 98
Hofstadter's prediction about the passing of the antitrust "movement"
was therefore premature. The antitrust movement had not died in 1964;
it had laid dormant for a while, but by the late 1970s a new breed of
antitrust reformer became vocal in the legal academy proclaiming the
case for a new type of antitrust law which ironically came to favor big
93. DtJXBURY, supra note 18, at 357.
94. The "New Antitrust" movement helped to resurrect the "nineteenth-century belief
in economic Darwinism, including an abiding faith that (with the exception of price fixing)
the 'firm, in its own interests, will make the best choice for consumers.'" Adams & Brock,
supra note 26, at 942 (quoting BORK, supra note 18, at 208).
95. See Big Shift in Antitrust Policy, supra note 41, at 38; William F. Baxter, Respond-
ing to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CAL. L. Rav. 618, 630 (1983).
96. See Adams & Brock, supra note 7, at 258. Thus William Baxter, as Chief of the
Antitrust Division, helped promulgate new merger guidelines based on the policy that
"most mergers do not threaten competition and that many are in fact procompetitive and
benefit consumers." Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,824 (1984), reprinted in 46 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169, at S-I (Supp. June 14, 1984).
97. See DUXnURY, supra note 18, at 356.
98. Id. at 357.
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business and justified minimal antitrust enforcement. 99 The New Anti-
trust movement ultimately served to provoke a general debate about the
goals and objectives to be served by antitrust enforcement.
A coalition of liberal antitrust scholars came to rethink the implications
and meaning of the intellectual history recounted in the Hofstadter essay.
Thus, by the mid-1980s one could also find a counter-movement within
the scholarly ranks of antitrust law teachers, such as Professor Eleanor M.
Fox, who openly proclaimed that they were "battling for the soul of anti-
trust."'1 These antitrust "true believers" described themselves as "faith-
ful interpreters of the law," who understood the "real history of antitrust"
as one representing "concern for consumers; concern for the 'little man';
interest in access, diversity, and pluralism; and condemnation of coercion
and exploitation.'' 1 In their view, the New Antitrust movement was "at
war with law" because it had turned its back on the values and practices
of a great legal specialty.
As the 1980s came to a close, antitrust law seemed like it might be
going somewhere. The debate between the New Antitrust advocates and
the "true believers" suggested that antitrust was on the move again-that
the passion that had fueled the movement had been ignited again by a
new debate about the politics and social meaning of antitrust. At least
that is how it seemed as we approached the 1990s.
But then something happened. The debate fizzled and cooled. It fiz-
zled because the world changed unexpectedly. There were new market-
places and new technologies that required new thinking about the
relevance of antitrust's traditional philosophy and analytic framework in
a new world order. These changes have provoked antitrust thinkers to
make shifts in the theoretical models they use in antitrust analysis. New
forms of competition posed new sorts of problems that required a new
sophistication. The passion of the New Antitrust movement thus cooled
as policy makers and antitrust thinkers contemplated the limits of the the-
oretical complexity of economic analysis.
The dominant assumption of firm rationality central to the Chicago
School of antitrust could no longer explain patterns of strategic behavior
exhibited in markets linked globally by new information technologies.
Sophiticated accounts of firm behavior now justify the relaxation of the
assumption of rationality in favor of strategic or opportunistic accounts of
behavior. As one commentator recently explained: "In the past ten
years, antitrust economists of the post-Chicago School, applying insights
from game theory, have postulated that strategic behavior can enable
99. The influence of the New Antitrust movement was aided by the Reagan adminis-
tration's appointment to the federal judiciary of individuals who satisfied a political litmus
test in support of limited government and big business. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at
358-59.
100. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917
(1987).
101. Id. at 917.
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firms to achieve market dominance.' 10 2 The post-Chicago School ap-
proach, building a more sophisticated framework upon the Chicago
School's theory of rational firm behavior, offered complicated strategic
behavior models for understanding "how small and moderate-sized firms
can use market imperfections to disadvantage competitors."'1 03
Antitrust law now presides over postindustrial markets-markets that
entail new competitive conditions and require new critical techniques of
investigation. It is now recognized that in high-tech markets involved in
the information superhighway (e.g., computers, program design, chips,
and fiber-optics), innovation and standard design will be more important
to antitrust analysis than the traditional pricing and output considera-
tions.1°4 In these high-tech industries, a small handful of firms establish
alliances that become the basis for vigorous forms of rivalry and approxi-
mate the level of competition expected in highly concentrated market
structures. In the information economies of advanced informational sys-
tems, markets are created and destroyed quickly and endlessly as technol-
ogy is manipulated and refigured to establish new symbols, new
information, and new markets. The reality of a new form of competition
arising in the emerging postindustrial markets has exasperated antitrust's
current predicament.
III. ANTITRUST IN THE POSTINDUSTRIAL ERA
As I sat listening to the speakers at the AALS meeting, I was reminded
how much the world has changed in the last few years. In just a few short
years, the social, political, and economic landscape of the world changed.
We now live in the postindustrial era.'0 5 In the postindustrial era, mar-
kets are linked globally by informational systems and information is itself
the most important product in the market. The growth of information
economies based on computer systems and the emerging information su-
102. Jacobs, supra note 19, at 36 (contending that, "[tlo behave strategically, firms need
not be large, but they must understand and seize opportunities for gaining power at their
rivals' expense.").
103. Id. at 37.
Post-Chicagoans have described several ways in which firms can put such
strategic behavior to anti-competitive use. Some have suggested that firms in
competitive markets can attain monopoly power by foreclosing rivals from
lower cost inputs; this practice raises rivals' costs and forces them either to
quit the market or to increase prices to levels at which the strategic firms can
earn supra-competitive profits. Others have proposed that predatory pricing,
which some judges and academicians consider implausible, can succeed in
certain markets if the predator implements the proper strategy. Still others
have hypothesized that strategic behavior can take the form of advertising,
investment, product selection, or other activities that raise the cost of doing
business or deter entry. In general, post-Chicagoans emphasize the capacity
of market imperfections to create market power, even for firms with small
market shares.
Id. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
104. See, e.g., Symposium: Joint Ventures, Including Strategic Alliances, To Develop
Computer Technology, 61 ArrRusT L.J. 859-973 (1993).
105. See supra note 4.
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perhighway of the internet have provided new forms of competition
which do not easily fit within the traditional concepts of competition used
by antitrust policy makers in the recent past.
There are many different concepts of competition, 10 6 but the one most
relevant to modern antitrust law has been understood as "a term of art,"
which refers to the idea of "competition on the merits."'01 7 In antitrust
law, "competition on the merits" has been conceived in terms of a market
construct in which numerous, small, independent actors make individual
choices based on the separate price of a good and its merits. Competition
on the merits describes a state of affairs that closely resembles the econo-
mists' notion of perfect competition. In perfectly competitive markets,
the product is homogeneous and the only real basis for competition is
price. Competition on the merits is thus a shorthand expression that
designates lawful competition based on product prices.
In postindustrial markets, competition has a new meaning that is linked
to technology and information. What we see developing in the emerging
information economies of postindustrial markets is a new form of compe-
tition based on the development of technologies utilized for processing
and disseminating information. The industries which are now involved in
the development of information technologies (e.g., computer software
programs, fiber-optics, wireless cellular communication) compete on the
basis of offering new and better systems for processing and disseminating
information. Technological competition, based on the development of
new and better information systems, provides these markets with a differ-
ent understanding of what competition on the merits means.
In the emerging informational economies linked by computer net-
works, it is difficult to defend the old policy justifications that once
molded the solid consensus in support of antitrust regulation of big busi-
ness. When transactions are transnational and competition is global, na-
tional law can be a hindrance to economic development and market
competition.' 0 8 The stakes are especially high for multinational corpora-
tions involved in information technologies that are quite unlike the old
106. See BORK, supra note 18, at 58-61 (identifying at least four different conceptions of
competition utilized by judges in thinking about antitrust problems). Bork says 'Competi-
tion' may be read: (1) "as the process of rivalry"; (2) "as the absence of restraint over one
person's or firm's economic activities by any other person or firm"; (3) "as that state of the
market 'in which the individual buyer or seller does influence the price by his purchases or
sales"; (4) "in a meaning closely related to the one just discussed, as the existence of 'frag-
mented industries and markets' [reserved] 'through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses' "; or (5) "as a shorthand expression, a term of art, designating any state
of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alternative state
of affairs through judicial decree." Id. at 58-60. Professor Rudolph J. Peritz has in turn
chronicled a different understanding of competition based on the identification of two par-
adigms of competition in the history of antitrust law-a dominant paradigm of competition
policy favoring competitive freedom and a less visible, but nonetheless existent, paradigm
of common law property rights. See Rudolph J. Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust
Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1989).
107. BORK, supra note 18, at 61.
108. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Tenth Milton Handler Lecture: Antitrust, Trade and
the 21st Century - Rounding the Circle, 48 REc. Ass'N B. Cirv N.Y. 535, 558 (1993).
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smokestack industries that national antitrust law was created to regu-
late. 10 9 In the emerging new global webs of information economies, we
are thus witnessing what Professor William F. Baxter has called a "new
kind of competition" that "presents a new problem for Government, and
we're going to see it again and again.""10
This "new kind of competition" is premised upon the ability of firms to
manipulate and disseminate information over the information highway of
the computer networks of the world. Traditional thinking about the way
markets operate has been influenced by a market framework of analysis
that has assumed competition is a process involving prices and output
decisions of different firms and different industry structures. For exam-
ple, traditional antitrust analysis has assumed that as the number of firms
in the industry decline (i.e., as the industry became relatively concen-
trated), output would be restricted, prices would go up, and consumers
would be worse off. "In the world of computer software and microchips,"
however, "markets are often guided by different rules, which can result in
a near-monopoly position for the winner.""'
In the marketplaces established by informational economies, new tech-
nologies frequently require capital investments and research capabilities
that only a few firms can manage and deploy in the competitive struggle.
Competition in such cases can be vigorous and extreme even though only
a handful of firms are involved. The dangers of monopoly may be pres-
ent, but it is difficult to determine the exact nature of such danger if the
market for some new technology has yet to materialize. Firms that com-
pete to be industry leaders in high-tech markets never know where the
109. The question posed by the new technologies of postindustrial markets is whether
the same antitrust rules applicable to the oil, steel, and telephone industries should also
apply to the computer software industry. See Edmund L. Andrews, A Question of Trust;
Oi4 Phones, Software: Do the Same Rules Apply?, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1995, at DI. IBM's
recent $3.3 billion takeover of Lotus Development Corporation, which specializes in
notebook computer programs, and Microsoft's failed $2 billion attempt to take over Intuit,
a rival software company specializing in financial software, are recent examples of the
emerging information economy. Should the antitrust laws be interpreted to forbid these
takeovers? Should the same rules applicable to oil and phones apply to them?
These recent developments have been reported as the beginning of a new "collaborative
computing environment" where "people can work and communicate across corporate and
national borders-without worrying about things like incompatible hardware and
software." Steve Lohr, From Calculator to Communications Tool: As the Role of the Com-
puter Changes, Companies Try to Keep Pace, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1995, at D1 (quoting
Louis V. Gerstner, Jr's "Dear Colleague" letter to IBM workers). IBM's acquisition of
Lotus, for example, gives IBM a new basis to challenge Microsoft's competitive advantage
in computer-linked programs that have replaced the need for IBM's once dominant main-
frame computer systems. Lotus Notes is now an industry leader in a category of software
programs called "groupware" that allows desktop computers to be linked as a computer-
team system. The IBM-Lotus merger and Microsoft's failed attempt to take over Intuit,
are just the first examples of the new wave of organizational changes many observes be-
lieve are necessary to render American computer firms competitive in the emerging infor-
mation economy.
110. See Steve Lohr, Power Grab: Ground Rules for the Great Global Connection, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1995, § 4, at 1 (quoting William F. Baxter). Professor Baxter was Chief of
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department from 1981 to 1983. Id.
111. Id. at 16.
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technological winds will blow. Today's investment may be tomorrow's
loss in a useless technology if it is no longer regarded as a standard for the
industry. Market domination of relevant markets may quickly erode as
new alliances between technology-oriented firms enable competitors to
develop new and better design technologies.
Market dominance in technology-based markets may be the result of
what happens when popular technology becomes the de facto standard
for the industry. This is what happened when the VHS format of video-
cassette tapes became the favored industry standard for all VCRs,
thereby relegating Betamax tapes to the dust bin of industrial obsoles-
cence. The beta format for videocassette recorders was developed by
Sony of Tokyo, and the VHS format was developed by Victor Company
of Japan, a subsidiary of the Osaka-based Matsushita Corporation. These
two Japanese giants are now embroiled in a similar competitive struggle
over whether the cassette or mini-disk formats will be used in the next
generation of audio systems. Digital compact cassettes and mini-disks
represent two alternative formats for audio systems. The two systems, on
the market since 1992, are designed to provide digital sound and the abil-
ity to record. By some accounts, Sony's mini-disks seem to be winning
the approval of consumers, and may provide Sony with "sweet revenge"
for its loss in the earlier standard battle with Matsushita over video cas-
sette format." 2
Another recent example involves a standards battle over a new com-
puter-disk technology that uses a new high-density compact disk, similar
to music CD or CD-ROM disks, but one that would store substantially
more information. The high-density compact disks will "reap billions of
dollars in royalties" in light of the likely "cross industry" uses of the new
compact computer disks in various computer systems and functions. 113
Two different standards for these disks have been introduced by Phillips
Electronics and Sony, on the one hand, and Tume Warner and Toshiba
Corporation on the other. 1 4 The struggle to determine who will be the
standard bearer for high-density compact disks will likely determine who
will reap the lion's share of the royalties, and will thus serve to establish a
new dominant player in the informational economy of the twenty-first
century.
Other examples can be expected as firms enter the information mar-
kets linked by the internet and groupware computer systems. We can
expect to see much more interdependence in these markets as the devel-
oping technologies enable users located in different countries to work col-
laboratively on the same file simultaneously. These new global
information economies depend on communication technologies struc-
112. See Andrew Pollack, Matsushita Says It Will Sell Rival's Mini-Disk System, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at C5.
113. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Gateway 2000 Backs Sony/Philips Disk Format, N.Y.
TiMis, June 16, 1995, at C8.
114. Id.
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tured by a common systems standard. Information technology generates
a new form of market rivalry that will culminate in the selection of a
technology standard, and the selection of the standard will serve to en-
trench the market position of the firm responsible for the standard.
Economists call this the "bandwagon effect" of standards competition.
The bandwagon effect describes the choice that results when firms within
an industry agree to adopt a single standard for their products and tech-
nologies. 115 The bandwagon effect, characteristic of high-tech industries
(especially those involved in information technologies), fosters the condi-
tions that lead to large firm size and concentrated market structures. 116
The bandwagon effect is an important characteristic of market behavior
in high-tech industries where standards play a crucial role.117 We can ex-
pect to see more and more firms in the information economies attempting
to reap the huge advantages of the bandwagon effect in the next genera-
tion of information technologies.
In the current postindustrial landscape, global multinational corpora-
tions and institutions will disrupt the influence of nation-based corpora-
tions and institutions. In the emerging informational economies, power
will be manifested not by allocative efficiency in production as such, but
rather by the ability to manipulate and disseminate information. Whom-
ever has the ability to specify the standards used to gain access to infor-
mation systems will have the power to influence price and output
decisions. Those "in power" will be those who have won the battle for
the prevailing technological standards of the industry. The development
of new industry standards will, therefore, require firms to invest in risky
technologies that only the largest corporations can support. The band-
wagon effect of competition for standards will ensure that only a handful
of the largest firms will survive in the future.
Traditional antitrust thinkers understand "power" as something that
can be empirically measured in terms of the percentage share of a rele-
vant product and geographic market."18 Traditional antitrust thinking
about power issues thus assumes that legal inferences about unlawful acts
of monopolization can be drawn after measuring the percentage of a
firm's share of a relevant product and geographical market definitions.
The larger the percentage of the relevant market, the more likely it will
be that antitrust decision makers will draw an inference that the firm has
unlawfully monopolized a market, or conclude that a pending merger
may substantially lessen competition. Firms with large market shares
115. Lohr, supra note 110, at 16.
116. As Charles F. Rule, a partner at Covington and Burling, a law firm in Washington
D.C., who was chief of the Antitrust Division at Justice from 1986 to 1989, explained: "In
high-tech markets where standards are important, the big get bigger ... and there's noth-
ing necessarily wrong with it." Id.
117. It is recognized that "[s]upplying the hardware, software and services for these
networks looms as a huge business for the computer industry." Lohr, supra note 109, at
D1.
118. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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must always keep one eye on the Antitrust Division whenever they at-
tempt to stay ahead of new technological developments. The ever-pres-
ent threat of antitrust intervention has influenced what firms do in these
high-tech markets.
For example, the Antitrust Division's recent antitrust suit to block
Microsoft's attempted acquisition of Intuit, Inc.119 chilled the deal and
was purportedly a reason for Micosoft's subsequent decision to rescind its
offer. It was hardly clear, however, that Microsoft's entry into the per-
sonal finance computer market would have diminished competition,
given that many other dominant firms were attempting to establish them-
selves as major players in the personal computer market in which Intuit
now operates. 120 It may not be in the best interest of consumers to pre-
vent firms like Microsoft from expanding in order to become more tech-
nologically competitive in global markets.
It is far from clear whether traditional antitrust concepts work in such
cases. Assume, for a moment, that Microsoft went ahead with its plan to
acquire Intuit, and the antitrust suit by the Justice Department went for-
ward. A key issue in the case against Microsoft would have involved the
definition of the relevant product market.1 1 The problem is that the per-
sonal finance computer market is just now emerging, and it is far from
certain how that market should be defined. 122 Even if the relevant mar-
ket could be defined (which is highly doubtful), does it follow that
Microsoft's share of that market (even if substantial in percentage terms)
would justify the legal inference that the merger might substantially limit
market competition given IBM's recent acquisition of Lotus? Can we be
certain that the underlying technology for this market will remain con-
stant over the relatively short-run? The problem with traditional anti-
trust notions of the "relevant market" is that the relevant market may not
exist at the time the analysis must be conducted, because the technology
establishing the market has not yet congealed with sufficient clarity to
identify the dimensions of the market.
IV. ANTITRUST LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Antitrust law needs a new framework and justification for responding
to the political, social, and economic conditions that are now shaping the
emerging postindustrial marketplace. The political, social, and economic
conditions in which advanced Western societies find themselves are un-
119. Intuit is the maker of Quicken, the leading personal finance software program.
120. See Andrews, supra note 109, at D7. The merger would have enabled Microsoft to
establish entry into the electronic banking, bill paying, and other financial computer sys-
tems in which a number of large corporations like Mastercard, Visa, American Express,
and Bank of America, are aspiring to enter.
121. Id.
122. Should it be defined to include only "personal finance-check writing programs" as
the Justice Department claimed, or should it be broadened to include all potential users
who might view computer financial software as an attractive substitute to manual computa-
tion (e.g., balancing a checkbook "with a pencil.") See id.
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like those that shaped the structure of American antitrust law in the nine-
teenth century. The traditional fear of concentrated power that justified
antitrust regulation seems less relevant today.
Today, the traditional notions of "industry" and "production," which
have historically shaped antitrust analysis of market power, seem less per-
tinent in a world dominated by multinational corporations operating
within an information economy linked globally by computers and the in-
ternet. In collaborative computing environments, businesses and people
communicate across corporate and national borders on the information
highway structured by collaborative technologies and linked by the com-
patible information systems of multinational corporations. The nation-
state framework of traditional antitrust analysis is becoming irrelevant to
the information economy of the twenty-first century.
Traditional measures of market power, based on relevant product and
geographic market definitions, would seem to be ill-suited for markets
characterized by technological competition. In high-tech markets, for ex-
ample, strategic alliances between large firms in the market may be nec-
essary to implement technological developments. The emergence of
strategic alliances in the computer and electronics industries, for example,
have promoted the development of new technologies and consequently
have enabled these firms to compete in the global marketplace. "High
technology companies are typically locked in a vicious circle of global
competition: Innovation creates demand; demand creates more competi-
tion; competition leads to lower prices and more innovation, at ever-in-
creasing fixed costs; price erosion and performance improvements
accelerate demand further.' 23 As a result, competition in high-tech in-
dustries has required strategic alliances and cooperative arrangements
between firms. It thus remains a debatable point whether Microsoft's ac-
quisition of Intuit would enhance or hinder competition in the emerging
personal finance computer market.
If there is a danger posed by the existence of monopoly power in the
emerging information economies, it is likely to come from an industry
standard bearer's ability to control access to the market by manipulating
the conditions for use of the standard technology used by the industry. In
high-tech information markets, technological standards used by the in-
dustry can give firms like Microsoft and IBM dominant market positions.
Problems of foreclosure are likely to be great in technological markets
based on standards. Foreclosure dangers, however, are difficult to assess
given that market position is achieved initially through the development
of new technologies.
Technological manipulation may indeed be a new predatory strategy
utilized by high-tech firms to foreclose competition in developing new
markets, but the welfare effects of such a strategy remain indeterminant.
123. Charles T.C. Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition: A Perspective




The problem is that even in traditional markets, "true anticompetitive
foreclosure cases-those involving practices that unambiguously reduce
economic welfare-may well exist, but they have yet to be confidently
identified [by modern economic thought]." 124
This suggests that some of the key concepts of traditional antitrust law
utilized to analyze problems of monopoly power may no longer be useful
for evaluating antitrust enforcement policy in the emerging postindustrial
markets. Postindustrial markets are structured by new technologies that
render the nation-state framework of antitrust regulation irrelevant.
Globalization and transnational transactions remain largely outside the
reach of domestic antitrust regulation. New sources of power (e.g., power
developed from the control of information and technology) seem to fall
outside the measures of monopoly power utilized in the traditional anti-
trust analysis of power issues. The measurement of market power, which
under traditional analysis requires the definition of the relevant product
and geographic market, will be one of the most elusive and difficult
problems of antitrust law in the next century. At the same time, new
theories of foreclosure are needed to explain how technological foreclo-
sure can be utilized to entrench monopoly power.
In the emerging postindustrial economies of global multinational cor-
porations and institutions, economic models developed originally for ana-
lyzing the smokestack industries of the nineteenth century may seem
more relevant as historical fact than as a functional framework for under-
standing contemporary economic realities. Changes in theoretical think-
ing about antitrust problems, globalization of markets, new technological
developments, as well as the serious practical problems of implementing
the new sophistication of antitrust economics, have shattered the once
confident vision of legal process theorists. Lacking a theoretical consen-
sus for engaging their analysis, antitrust specialists have lost confidence in
antitrust enforcement, and hence, antitrust's current predicament.
V. CONCLUSION: SEARCHING FOR ANTITRUST AT
CENTURY'S END
Aware of the limitations of the new sophistication of the post-Chicago
approach to antitrust, some antitrust thinkers are calling for a return to
antitrust's "jurisprudential past."'1 25 Some antitrust thinkers go so far as
to call for a return to the legal process jurisprudence that historically
shaped the Supreme Court's vision of antitrust ever since the Warren
Court era.126
The appeal of process thinking is attractive because it is thought that a
return to the rationalistic analytic of legal reasoning might stabilize anti-
124. John E. Lopatka & Andrew N. Kleit, The Mystery of Lorain Journal and the Quest
for Foreclosure in Antitrust, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1306 (1995).
125. Jacobs, supra note 19, at 53. See also Page, supra note 38 (arguing for a return of
the influence of legal process jurisprudence in antitrust adjudication).
126. See Page, supra note 38; Jacobs, supra note 19.
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trust law and thus be the basis for the emergence of a new antitrust con-
sensus. It is, however, difficult to imagine the possibility of a return to
legal process thinking in antitrust or any other area of the law today. The
central challenge to legal process thinking posed by now diverse theoreti-
cal movements such as law and economics, critical legal studies, and
postmodernism makes it difficult to imagine the return of the legal ana-
lytic of process theory at the end of the twentieth century. 127 "After the
critiques of law and economics, critical legal studies and postmodernism,
the legal process confidence in courts seems difficult to maintain, and im-
possible to use as the basis of a new synthesis for legal scholarship.' '1 28
The effort to preserve the image of law and adjudication as an apolitical
process has become exhausted, and there is no reason for believing that
antitrust law is an exception to the current situation.
We can, however, learn from antitrust's recent history. That history
tells us what can happen when antitrust becomes entrapped by dogma,
whether it be legal or economic. Dogmas can be helpful if they are rele-
vant to their times, but when change does come, old dogmas can lead us
down the wrong road. The old problem of monopoly power remains as
relevant today as it was when the Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted,
but the old dream of achieving certainty through contemporary legal pro-
cess theory or contemporary economics has been shattered by an ever-
changing and highly diverse new world order. Legal process theory can
provide lawyers with a useful framework for analyzing legal issues; and
economic theory can "provide a powerful, general set of guidelines for
posing questions, and for framing the analysis of issues in industrial or-
ganization and antitrust policy."'1 29 But each acting alone cannot provide
a guide for deciding competitive problems in the emerging postindustrial
markets.
Economic conditions are now changing in ways that could not have
been imagined when antitrust policy makers developed legal process and
economic theories for antitrust law. Antitrust law in the postindustrial
era must, therefore, be rethought from the "bottom up." We need to
rethink how some of the most fundamental concepts of antitrust-con-
cepts like "relevant market," "monopoly power," "anticompetitive fore-
closure," and "competition on the merits"-actually work in
postindustrial markets. We also need to study the operation of postindus-
trial economies so that we might discover new concepts to understand
better how the old problem of monopoly power functions in these emerg-
ing marketplaces.
In our search for a new postindustrial law of antitrust, we should also
reexamine antitrust's history and development during the Reagan-Bush
127. See MINDA, supra note 69, at 224-57.
128. Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 Wis. L.
REV. 463,477 (reviewing NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTI-
TUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994)).
129. Adams & Brock, supra note 7, at 326.
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era. We need to reexamine the reasons for the dramatic decline of anti-
trust enforcement. We should also be more curious about the lack of
public attention now afforded antitrust. We should think more about
what did happen to the antitrust movement. An examination of such
things might shed new insight needed for determining what to do about
antitrust law's current predicament. It might also enable us to figure out
how antitrust regulation should proceed in the postindustrial era.
In order to do this, antitrust decision makers will have to rethink the
purpose and justification of antitrust regulation in the emerging new
world order. Judges and lawyers must give more consideration to how
the historical goals of antitrust regulation would play out in the emerging
postindustrial marketplaces. For
[a]bove all, resolving antitrust issues calls for judgment. And that
judgment is-and must be-informed as much by socio-political val-
ues as it is by economic facts and theory, because the interpretation
of antitrust statutes, and the operational policies derived from their
application to concrete cases, ultimately are determined by the kind
of society a nation prefers. 130
Antitrust law must change in fundamental ways if it is to remain rele-
vant in the twenty-first century. The economy in which antitrust now re-
sides is quite unlike the one that existed in 1890 or 1960. The
development of new technologies and the unfolding of world events have
completely changed antitrust's landscape. Today our greatest danger lies
in the fear of change. Antitrust specialists must be willing to resist their
fear of change; they must be willing to consider new possibilities and new
ways of dealing with antitrust problems now unfolding at the century's
end. One does not have to be an enemy of antitrust to see that we des-
perately need new ways of responding to the emerging economic
problems of postindustrialism.
I do not mean to suggest that traditional antitrust analysis of market
power is no longer relevant for the twenty-first century. In the next cen-
tury, we will surely have many local and national markets involving hos-
pitals, telephones, cement, steel, and other domestic industries where
traditional antitrust analysis will remain relevant. 131 On the other hand,
we are also witnessing the development of new industries and new mar-
kets, including computers, VCRs, CD-ROM, and telecommunications,
that no longer seem to fit within antitrust's traditional framework of anal-
ysis. Moreover, even long-established industries like the automobile in-
dustry have been fundamentally transformed by global competition,
rendering antitrust analysis less relevant to the products they produce. 132
130. Id. at 327.
131. See Fox, supra note 108, at 228.
132. In the postindustrial era there "is coming to be no such organization as an 'Ameri-
can' (or British or French or Japanese or West German) corporation, nor any finished good
called an 'American' (or British, French, Japanese, or West German) product." REICH,
supra note 4, at 110. In the emerging postindustrial global webs, "products are interna-
tional composites":
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Many thoughtful practitioners and scholars believe that antitrust law
remains relevant for analyzing the new technologies of the next century.
Anne K. Bingaman, of the Antitrust Division, is certainly correct when
she says that "vigorous, intelligent antitrust enforcement is as vital to the
economic health of our nation in the twenty-first century as it has been
for the twentieth century."'133 Of course, the real question is how do we
ensure that antitrust enforcement remains vital to the economic health of
our nation in the twenty-first century? Should we continue to develop
enforcement policies based on traditional analysis of smokestake indus-
tries, or should we seek to formulate a new enforcement policy developed
from an understanding of the new industry structures now emerging in
the postindustrial marketplaces of the informational economy?
These are the "big" questions posed by antitrust at century's end. I do
not have any quick fixes or easy solutions to these "big" questions. I can
offer only one insight. It is this. Only one thing can be said with cer-
tainty-antitrust law must change if it is to remain relevant in the next
century. The steady decline in antitrust's importance will continue if anti-
trust law remains stable and does not change. Of course, this should
come as no surprise-the only reliable constant is change; there is no
reason for expecting that antitrust law is immune to change.
If antitrust is to remain relevant at century's end, antitrust law and pol-
icy will have to be reinvented for postindustrial world markets. Antitrust,
like everything else in the law, will have to be updated for the times in
which it resides, otherwise it will become, like the antitrust teachers
searching for the meeting room at the AALS conference, a law "in search
of itself." Antitrust at century's end is, therefore, very much in the same
position as the lost antitrust teachers at the AALS conference. Antitrust
is in search of its historical mission and justification in a new world order.
In the postindustrial world order, however, we need to do more than
just find our way. We need to rediscover where we want to go before we
can determine how to get there. We need a competition policy for deal-
ing with the competitive dangers of an increasing global and intercon-
nected market economy. We need new metaphors and new concepts for
dealing with the competitive challenges of living in a postmodern and
postindustrial world order. We need to rethink antitrust's purpose in the
When an American buys a Pontiac Le Mans from General Motors, for exam-
le, he or she engages unwittingly in an international transaction. Of the
10,000 paid to GM, about $3,000 goes to South Korea for routine labor and
assembly operations, $1,750 to Japan for advanced components (engines,
transaxles, and electronics), $750 to West Germany for styling and design
engineering, $400 to Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan for small components,
$250 to Britain for advertising and marketing services, and about $50 to Ire-
land and Barbados for data processing. The rest-less than $4,000-goes to
strategists ....
I&d at 113. In such a world it is difficult to tell who is whom. See also Fox, supra note 108,
at 558.
133. See Anne K. Bingaman, Antitrust Policy for the Twenty-First Century, 48 SMU L.
REv. ?, ? (1995).
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emerging new economies of the world. In short, we need to develop a
postindustrial law of antitrust for the twenty-first century. We should not
be deterred by our natural fear of change.
